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Capitalism and Risk: Concepts,
Consequences, and Ideologies
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.†
INTRODUCTION
Politically charged claims about both “capitalism” and
“risk” became increasingly insistent in the late twentieth
century. The end of the post-World War II boom in the 1970s
and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union inspired
fervent new commitments to capitalist ideas and institutions.
At the same time structural changes in the American
economy and expanded industrial development across the
globe generated sharpening anxieties about the risks that
those changes entailed. One result was an outpouring of
roseate claims about capitalism and its ability to control
those risks, including the use of new techniques of “risk
management” to tame financial uncertainties and guarantee
stability and prosperity. Despite assurances, however, recent
decades have shown many of those claims to be overblown, if
not misleading or entirely ill-founded. Thus, the time seems
ripe to review some of our most basic economic ideas and, in
doing so, reflect on what we might learn from past centuries
about the nature of both “capitalism” and “risk,” the
relationship between the two, and their interactions and
consequences in contemporary America.
I. CAPITALISM
Attempts to define capitalism have ignited “immense
controversy,”1 and the only general agreement is that the
† The author is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor at New York Law
School. He would like to thank Robert Blecker, Jethro K. Lieberman, Richard
Marsico, Carlin Meyer, Frank Munger, Rebecca Roiphe, and David Schoenbrod
for their insightful comments, Michael McCarthy for his invaluable help in
securing source materials, and Dana Cimera and Jordan Moss for their excellent
research assistance.
1. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 43 (1976).
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term refers to a wide variety of arrangements that change
over time. An “individual economy may be conducted along
capitalistic lines to the most widely varying extent,” Max
Weber explained.2 “The essential point to grasp is that in
dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary
process,” Joseph Schumpeter added.3 It is “by nature a form
or method of economic change and not only never is but never
can be stationary.”4 By the early twentieth century economic
literature offered 111 different definitions.5
True, what came to be called capitalism in the nineteenth
century is commonly identified with certain characteristics:
private property, contractual freedom, wage labor, profitseeking, invested surplus, competitive markets, expanding
commodification, rationality and calculation, and production
for sale rather than use.6 Those are all elastic concepts,
however, and they define little meaningful consensus. Joan
Robinson and John Maynard Keynes, for example, stressed
the centrality of just one—the profit motive7—while Fernand
Braudel denied that markets were specific to capitalism,8 and
other historians have shown the same for wage labor.9
2. MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 275 (Frank H. Knight trans.,
Martino Publishing 2013) (1927).
3. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
(Harper Colophon 1975) (1942).

SOCIALISM

AND

DEMOCRACY

82

4. Id.
5. JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL
HISTORY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 668-69 (Patrick Camiller trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 2014) (2009).
6. See, e.g., Robert L. Heilbroner, Capitalism, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 688-93 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds.,
2d ed. 2008); Capitalism, in BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 74 (John Downes & Jordon Elliot Goodman eds., 4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter
Capitalism, in BARRON’S].
7. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 50 (1927); JOAN
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC HERESIES: SOME OLD-FASHIONED QUESTIONS IN ECONOMIC
THEORY 25 (1971).
8. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, 3 CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH–18TH
CENTURY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD 620 (Sian Reynolds trans., Harper &
Row 1984) (1979).
9. See Jeffrey Sklansky, The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual and Social
Histories of Capitalism, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 233, 237 (2012). These views
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Consider “competitive markets.” First of all, capitalist
firms themselves regularly reshape the size and nature of
competition by expanding or contracting their operations on
both horizontal and vertical levels.10 More broadly, ideas and
structures of competitive markets change.11 Recently, for
example, defenders of capitalism have argued that economic
concentration was necessary to preserve America’s ability to
compete in global markets.12 Such an idea is light years from
Adam Smith’s belief that “competitive markets” required
large numbers of small and independent producers. Though
still widely invoked in apologetics, Smith’s idea no longer
seems applicable to most advanced capitalist economies
marked by “large realms of monopoly, oligopoly, and
monopolistic competition.”13 At a minimum, such changing
ideas and structures show that even purportedly “essential”
elements of capitalism exist in an evolving variety of forms.14
Moreover, most supposedly essential elements of
capitalism—contracts, markets, wage labor, private
property, and economic surpluses—have existed for
millennia and thus, however necessary to capitalism, cannot
challenge Weber’s analysis which emphasized the critical role of “free labor” in
rational “capitalistic calculation.” E.g., WEBER, supra note 2, at 277.
10. E.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 36-38 (1990); R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE
LAW (1988).
11. E.g., MICHAEL H. BEST, THE NEW COMPETITION: INSTITUTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL
RESTRUCTURING (1990); DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS,
AND GLOBALIZATION (2010); RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN
AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (rev. ed. 1996).
12. See Corinne Crawford, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Current Financial Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 127, 130 (2011).
13. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 2 (1970); see, e.g., Reed
Abelson, Bigger May be Better for Health Insurers, but Doubts Remain for
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015, at B3 (consolidation among health
insurance companies defended on grounds of “efficienc[y]”).
14. E.g., W. W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO 152 (3d ed. 1990); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
2001); Robert Boyer, The Variety and Unequal Performance of Really Existing
Markets: Farewell to Doctor Pangloss?, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE
EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 55, 66-70 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert
Boyer eds., 1997) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM].
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constitute any distinctive core. One could usefully see the
distinctive core of capitalism as three interrelated ideas
about private property and the dynamic tendencies those
ideas generated: first, the idea that property can be abstract
and liquid, appear in a multitude of forms, and be exchanged
systemically through numbers written on paper; second, the
idea that individuals should use property to create
commodities for sale and profit rather than for their own
consumption; and third, the idea that individuals should
pursue their own self interest and strive to amass the largest
amount of property as possible because doing so is both a
social and moral good.
Whatever its core elements and tendencies, however,
capitalism manifestly appears in a variety of forms.
Consider, for example, the slave economy of the antebellum
American South.15 Although many have seen Southern
slavery as “anti-capitalist,” it nonetheless operated with
capitalist values, practices, and institutions. While it had
distinguishing racial and cultural characteristics, it produced
for profit and required for its success contracts, credit,
insurance, private property, purchased labor, mass
production, and expanding commercial markets.16 The cotton
market—“the largest single sector of the global economy in
the first half of the nineteenth century”—comprised “in
actual fact a network of material connections that stretched
from Mississippi and Louisiana to Manhattan and Lowell to
Manchester and Liverpool.”17 The elaborate and manifold
elements of that network constituted one particular form of
capitalism, and consequently it was hardly surprising that
the Bank of the United States, thanks to its mortgage
business, became the largest slaveholder in Mississippi.18
15. See, e.g., Interchange: The History of Capitalism, 101 J. AM. HIST. 503, 510,
516 (2014).
16. See generally IAN BAUCOM, SPECTERS OF THE ATLANTIC: FINANCE CAPITAL,
SLAVERY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (2005); SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF
COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2014).
17. WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY
COTTON KINGDOM 10 (2013); see also id. at 252-54.

AND

EMPIRE

IN THE

18. RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, JR., SLAVE AGRICULTURE AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES IN
MISSISSIPPI, 1831–1852 (2006).
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The example of Southern slavery suggests two
conclusions. One is that capitalism should not be identified
narrowly with wage-labor but with the power of money to
command labor, however purchased and controlled. The
other is that capitalism has no “pure” existence and can be
accurately understood only by examining its varied historical
forms.
The necessity of detailed historical analysis is
particularly obvious when one considers the innumerable
conflicting claims that have been advanced about
capitalism’s alleged political consequences. Milton Friedman
put one such contention bluntly. “The kind of economic
organization that provides economic freedom, namely,
competitive capitalism,” he declared, “also promotes political
freedom.”19 Assuming that capitalist forms supported
democracy in the United States, as Friedman believed,
history shows that other capitalist forms in other countries
failed to support democracy in the same way and to the same
extent.20 Worse, it also shows that some capitalist forms
readily opposed or abandoned democracy and were
compatible with authoritarian regimes.21 German capitalism
failed to stop Nazism, while major German corporations and
business leaders worked closely with the Nazi government
and reaped profits from its most blatantly anti-democratic
policies.22 Indeed, the twentieth century introduced singleparty dictatorships directing forms of “state capitalism.”
19. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1962); see also FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN passim (1992) (drawing on
Hegel to argue that capitalism and democracy went hand in hand and that their
union represented the culmination of historical development).
20. See OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 5, at 572-633.
21. E.g., ROLAND SARTI, FASCISM AND THE INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP IN ITALY,
1919–1940: A STUDY IN THE EXPANSION OF PRIVATE POWER UNDER FASCISM (1971);
EUGEN WEBER, VARIETIES OF FASCISM (1964); THE ECONOMIC ACCOMPLICES TO THE
ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP: OUTSTANDING DEBTS (Horacio Verbitsky & Juan Pablo
Bohoslavsky eds., 2015); David Baker, The Political Economy of Fascism: Myth or
Reality, or Myth and Reality, 11 NEW POL. ECON. 227 (2006).
22. See, e.g., NEIL GREGOR, DAIMLER-BENZ IN THE THIRD REICH (1998); PETER
HAYES, INDUSTRY & IDEOLOGY: IG FARBEN IN THE NAZI ERA (1987); HAROLD JAMES,
THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE NAZI ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (2001);
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY IN NAZI GERMANY (Francis R. Nicosia & Jonathan Huener
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Thus, sweeping generalizations about the relationship
between capitalism and democracy—or between capitalism
and any other form of government—are highly dubious.23
Ultimately, they seem rooted in their proponents’ political
perspectives and historical contexts, and they assume that
capitalism has an essence that necessarily produces specific
political consequences independent of time, place, culture,
and historical context. History shows the fallacious nature of
that assumption. If some capitalist forms supported forms of
democracy under some historical conditions, other capitalist
forms meshed with anti-democratic forms under other
historical conditions.24
II. RISK IN CAPITALISM
The term “risk” can apply to any kind of peril, but the
capitalist concept involves more than danger of future harm.
It is an evaluative tool of business and finance with two
critical characteristics. It is socially constructed, and it is the
product of methodical calculation.25
The social construction of risk seems obvious when one
considers the diverse apprehensions of peoples who
worshiped different gods, lived in different times and places,
and relied on different material resources for their daily
sustenance.26 One of the principal functions of culture is to
eds., 2004). HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR., GERMAN BIG BUSINESS & THE RISE
HITLER (1985) explores the limits of businesses’ support for the Nazis.

OF

23. Seriously establishing any such causal connection would involve, among
other issues, answering difficult empirical questions about the extent to which a
country was truly “capitalist” and truly “democratic.” E.g., DIRK PHILIPSEN, THE
LITTLE BIG NUMBER: HOW GDP CAME TO RULE THE WORLD AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT
IT (2015) (economic measures of economic progress are misleading and distorted);
CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 59-66 (2007) (complexities involved in specifying
extent to which a country is truly “democratic”).
24. See, e.g., VIVEK CHIBBER, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY
CAPITAL (2013).

AND THE

SPECTER

OF

25. See, e.g., Mark J. Machina & Michael Rothschild, Risk, in 7 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 190, 190-96 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence
Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
26. See F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION
HAYEK, CONSTITUTION].

OF

LIBERTY 145 (1960) [hereinafter
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define normative categories that shape perceptions of peril
and therefore of risk.27 Further, recognition of risk depends
on the geographical, practical, and moral distances between
societies and whatever perils threaten, the methods of
perceiving those perils, and the benefits and burdens of
addressing them. Thus, social construction determines
whether risks are recognized or ignored, considered
preventable or inevitable, and ranked as minor or grave.28
Capitalist forms privilege perils that accompany
commercial and financial enterprises while minimizing those
rooted in traditional and religious values.29 Insurance,
spreading in the nineteenth century to cover previously
ignored types of perils, illustrates the process. Death was an
inevitability that rested in the hands of God until a
combination of social forces—law, religion, industrialism,
actuarial science, and corporate promotionalism—
transformed it into a “risk” that could be valued and used to
encourage the exchange of small regular payments for large
future returns.30 Similarly, economic changes in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated new
ideas about the interconnected nature of human activities
and gave rise to concepts of “social risk” that brought novel
proposals for “social” insurance.31
27. E.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen
E. Fields trans., Free Press 1995) (1912); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE
COOKED (John & Doreen Weightman trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1964).
28. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 29-30 (1982);
Introduction to Part One: Theorizing Risk and Morality, in RISK AND MORALITY
13, 15 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); Steve Raynor, Cultural
Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (Sheldon Krimsky
& Dominic Golding eds., 1992). For changing concepts in the United States, see
ARWEN P. MOHUN, RISK: NEGOTIATING SAFETY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2013).
29. See RISK AND MORALITY, supra note 28.
30. See generally VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979).
31. See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004).
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Capitalist forms not only shaped the cultural
construction of risk, but they also transformed it into a
methodical “calculating concept” for people learning how to
“consume the future.”32 Identifying perils whose incidence
and significance seemed calculable, capitalist forms gave
them monetary “value” and created multiplying ranges of
risk-based commodities defined in terms of the economic
interests and legal rights of human beings. Odysseus faced
many perils sailing the wine-dark sea, but in a capitalist
sense his voyage posed no “risk” absent a credit obligation or
insurance contract.
The “rational calculating” characteristic of capitalism33
was nowhere more apparent than in escalating efforts to
identify, quantify, and value “risk.”34 In the seventeenth
century, probabilistic reasoning was becoming common, and
by the early eighteenth century governments were compiling
massive sets of numbers by methodically collecting
information on the characteristics and activities of their
populations.35 By the nineteenth century statistical analysis
was well established, with actuarial tables in common use
and both the “law of large numbers” and the “bell-shaped
curve” fully recognized.36 From there, ever more powerful and
sophisticated statistical methods were developed and applied
to ever broader ranges of human activity, making the “risk”
involved in all of them a quality that could be calculated and
given a rational market price.37
32. Introduction to Part One: Theorizing Risk and Morality, in RISK
MORALITY, supra note 28, at 13.

AND

33. Stephen Innes, Puritanism and Capitalism in Early Massachusetts, in
CAPITALISM IN CONTEXT: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE IN HONOR OF R.M. HARTWELL 90 (John A. James & Mark Thomas eds.,
1994); see also, e.g., WEBER, supra note 2, at 254.
34. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 233-36 (2000); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL
THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 52-68 (2010).
35. GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., THE EMPIRE
CHANGED SCIENCE & EVERYDAY LIFE 6-26 (1989).

OF

CHANCE: HOW PROBABILITY

36. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 95-114 (1990); see also GIGERENZER
note 35, at 6-8, 53, 65.

ET AL., supra

37. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 234-35; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 34,
at 52; MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK
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Thus, “capitalism” and “risk” functioned together, the
former inspiring ways to create the latter by identifying
perils that could be given economic value and legal
protection, packaged in vendible forms, and traded freely for
profit. Capitalism expanded by monetizing more “perils” and
thereby creating more commodified “risks,” more value, and
more wealth.38 As those commodified risks multiplied and
their values swelled, capitalists layered and pyramided them
to create ever more value while, in the process, creating ever
more perils that could, in turn, be identified and transformed
into ever more “risks,” ever more commodities, and ever more
value and wealth.39 Thus capitalism and “risk” combined to
create a dynamic for both astonishing economic growth and
potentially devastating economic crises.40
The belief that risk could be rationally calculated
highlighted the concept’s social construction, for such
calculations were products of human imagination and
purpose. Thus, in understanding any particular risk it
became essential to know who identified and calculated it,
who used the calculation, and what results they sought.41 It
became necessary, in other words, to understand the
sociology of knowledge of risk.
MANAGEMENT (2007); Introduction to Part One: Theorizing Risk and Morality, in
RISK AND MORALITY, supra note 28, at 14.
38. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 55-56 (2000). Though
insurance can shift “risks,” the human consequences of perils remain with their
victims. See JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF
CAPITALISM AND RISK IN AMERICA 13 (2012); Barbara Young Welke, The Cowboy
Suit Tragedy: Spreading Risk, Owning Hazard in the Modern American
Consumer Economy, 101 J. AM. HIST. 97, 97-99 (2014).
39. See NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH
COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 66-67 (2010).
40. E.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY
FINANCIAL CRISES (1978); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY, at xxxiii, xxxix, 292
(2009); Christina D. Romer, Remeasuring Business Cycles, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 573
(1994); William H. Sewell, Jr., The Temporalities of Capitalism, 6 SOCIO-ECON.
REV. 517, 519-21 (2008).
OF

41. E.g., Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,
22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771 (1988).
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In practice, the capitalist habit of methodical risk
calculation did far more than create value and enhance
opportunities for rational market exchanges, for it also
inspired those with sufficient power to use such calculations
to shift anticipated risks onto weaker parties. Thus, as much
as capitalism was about “risk taking” by bold entrepreneurs,
it was also about “risk shifting” by the economically powerful.
Adhesion contracts required individuals to surrender
important legal rights and shifted risks from relatively
powerful producers to those who commonly lacked either
meaningful alternatives or adequate understandings of what
they were surrendering.42 “Releases” from workplace or
consumer injuries, “independent contractor” agreements,
anti-union policies, race- and gender-based wage
discriminations, and the use of part-time employees and
unpaid interns shifted operational costs onto the weak,
uninformed, and vulnerable.43 On a more sophisticated level
investment banks, brokerage firms, and credit agencies used
risk analysis to design complicated financial instruments
that generated huge fees and profits while shifting the risks
of those instruments onto distant, ill-informed, and often
misled investors.44 Indeed, during the past several decades
wealthy and powerful interests in the United States

42. E.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 679-93
(1996). As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote almost a century ago, “the
fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress.” Union
Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918).
43. E.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Action was Outside the Courts: Consumer
Injuries and the Uses of Contract in the United States, 1875–1945, in PRIVATE LAW
AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES IN
BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 505, 505-35 (Willibald
Steinmetz ed., 2000); Steven Greenhouse, More Workers are Claiming ‘Wage
Theft,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014, at A1. For the broad and unfortunate social
impact resulting from the decline of unions, see JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS
NO LONGER DO (2014).
44. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 231; see also BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER
ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS
FALL OF ENRON (2003); Nathaniel Popper, Goldman to Pay $3.15 Billion to Settle
Mortgage Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2014, at B3.
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succeeded in shifting a great variety of social and economic
risks onto weaker and more vulnerable social groups.45
Historically, the exploitation of government was likely
the most extensive form of capitalist risk-shifting. Private
entrepreneurs and investors enthusiastically relied on
government to bear the greatest and most far-reaching risks
involved in creating the conditions necessary for economic
growth and private profit making.46 Those risks involved
huge and continuous investments in elaborate order creating
and enforcing institutions and in massive infrastructure and
development projects, efforts whose risks were often
incalculable but whose results radically expanded
opportunities for private profit making. From courts, postal
services, and police and military protection to highways,
canals, railroads, and facilities for air travel to the internet,
cybernetics,
digitalization,
and
nanotechnologies,
government investment and leadership underwrote economic
growth, spurred ever more efficient methods of
transportation and communication, and generated stunning
new technologies that entrepreneurs exploited to create new
products and industries.47 Thus, in capitalist societies
governments commonly shouldered the economic risks that
posed the greatest uncertainties and required the most
massive investments, while private entrepreneurs and
investors subsequently exploited the results.48
Capitalist enterprises also learned to use risk in a variety
of other profit-enhancing ways. Some hyped or created
alleged “risks” to sell dubious products promoted as “risk

45. JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC
PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES passim (2002) [hereinafter
HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE]; JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT:
THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2008)
[hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT].
AND

46. See, e.g., CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL,
A.D. 990–1992 (1992).

AND

EUROPEAN STATES,

47. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (PublicAffairs 2015) (2013); PETER J. WESTWICK, THE
NATIONAL LABS: SCIENCE IN AN AMERICAN SYSTEM, 1947–1974 (2003).
48. See OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 5, at 670.
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reducing,”49 while others denied lethal risks to ensure the
continued marketability of truly perilous products.50
Financial services companies used risk to justify higher
premiums and interest rates for poor and minority
consumers even in the absence of sound statistical
justifications.51 Some companies weaponized the risks
involved in asserting legal claims against them by adopting
costly and burdensome litigation tactics that discouraged
potential claimants from challenging their practices and
products.52 Others avoided risks of liability for the wrongs
they caused by adopting legal devices that rendered them
judgment proof.53
Such uses of “risk” mocked a supposed moral premise of
capitalism, the claim that there was a merited correlation

49. See, e.g., ALISON BASS, SIDE EFFECTS: A PROSECUTOR, A WHISTLEBLOWER,
BESTSELLING ANTIDEPRESSANT ON TRIAL (2008); BEN GOLDACRE, BAD
PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS (2012);
MELODY PETERSEN, OUR DAILY MEDS: HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
TRANSFORMED THEMSELVES INTO SLICK MARKETING MACHINES AND HOOKED THE
NATION ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2008).
AND A

50. ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007); GERALD MARKOWITZ
& DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION passim (2002); Robert K. Jackler & Hussein A. Samji, The Price Paid:
Manipulation of Otolaryngologists by the Tobacco Industry to Obfuscate the
Emerging Truth that Smoking Causes Cancer, 122 LARYNGOSCOPE 75 (2012); Anne
Landman & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Efforts to Undermine PolicyRelevant Research, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 45 (2009).
51. RICHARD D. MARSICO, DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW, AND
REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 156-59 (2005); Lei Ding et al.,
Neighborhood Patterns of High-Cost Lending: The Case of Atlanta, 17 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193, 193-95 (2008); Jacob S. Rugh et
al., Race, Space, and Cumulative Disadvantage: A Case Study of the Subprime
Lending Collapse, 62 SOC. PROBS. 186 (2015); Rachel L. Swarns, Long Banned,
Mortgage Bias is Back as Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015, at A1; Racial Penalties
in Baltimore Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2015 (Sunday Review), at 10.
52. For the dynamic, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection
Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 440-59 (1992).
53. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-38 (1996).
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between risk and reward.54 It was fitting and reasonable,
Frederick Hayek wrote, that wealth should flow to “men who
accept the risk and responsibility of organizing the use of
resources.”55 In practice, however, capitalist forms inspired
and sanctioned many tactics that allowed the powerful to
break the link between “risk and responsibility” and to reap
the rewards while forcing the risks on others.
III. RISKS OF CAPITALISM
The most obvious risk of capitalist forms lies in the
continuous and disruptive changes they cause.56 “Creative
[d]estruction,” Schumpeter famously declared, “is the
essential fact about capitalism.”57 For more than two
centuries commentators debated the nature and direction of
those changes, and extreme positions became familiar.
Positive versions argued that capitalism produced freedom,
opportunity, and economic growth and that it ultimately led
to prosperity, democracy, and international cooperation.58
Negative versions maintained that capitalism created
massive inequalities, political oppression, and international
rivalries and that it ultimately led to fascism, imperialism,
and war.59 For positive versions, the risk was that capitalism
would be rejected, and the result would be political and
54. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 219; see DE SOTO, supra note 38, at 55-56;
GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 62, 106 (1981); Louis M. Hacker, The
Anticapitalist Bias of American Historians, in CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS 64,
88-89 (F. A. Hayek ed., 1954).
55. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 121; see id. at 96; accord GILDER,
supra note 54, at 245.
56. The social sciences developed out of the “reaction to the capitalist,
democratic, and industrial revolutions” and the acute recognition that
“traditional society was crumbling.” FRANK W. ELWALL, MACROSOCIOLOGY: THE
STUDY OF SOCIOCULTURAL SYSTEMS 11 (2009); accord STJEPAN G. MESTROVIC,
EMILE DURKHEIM AND THE REFORMATION OF SOCIOLOGY (1988).
57. SCHUMPETER, supra note 3, at 83.
58. E.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, Rival Views of Market Society, in RIVAL VIEWS
MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 105, 108-09 (1992) [hereinafter
HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS].
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59. E.g., J. A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1902); NIKOLAI LENIN,
IMPERIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (Vanguard Press 1927) (1917).
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economic oppression; for negative versions, the risk of
capitalism was that it would proceed unimpeded, and the
result would be political and economic oppression. None of
those extreme versions captured the complexities of
capitalism’s risks and consequences, and all were
oversimplified, essentially ahistorical, and ultimately
obscurantist.
One of the most intriguing characteristics of the debate
about those alleged mega risks of capitalism was the extent
to which analyses—including some positive ones—adopted
the underlying trope of capitalism’s “contradictions.” Marx
and Engels famously started the ball rolling when they
declared that the bourgeoisie inevitably produced “its own
gravediggers,”60 and subsequent analysts of varied stripes—
from Thorstein Veblen and Max Weber to Daniel Bell and
Irving Kristol—developed theories of such contradictions.61
Despite its frequent invocation, however, the trope of
contradiction was misleading. While it lured capitalism’s
adversaries with the promise of ultimate triumph and
counseled its defenders with the wisdom of strategic
compromise, the trope embodied a rationalist fallacy that
obscured rather than illuminated. Capitalist forms created
countless conflicts, tensions, disruptions, oppositions,
uncertainties, and instabilities, but those consequences were
hardly “contradictions” in any dialectical sense. Nor were
they inherent components of any inexorable process that
unfolded according to its own intrinsic logic. The trope of
contradiction ultimately assumed an overarching unity,
some pure form of capitalism with an unchanging core, but
capitalism constituted no such logical unity and existed in no
such pure form.
The fallacy in the trope of contradiction mirrored the
fallacy in the trope of the “iron laws” of classical economics.
Both posited inherent logics that purportedly ruled economic
60. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
(1848), reprinted in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 6, 20 (Lewis S.
Feuer ed., 1959).
61. DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976); IRVING
KRISTOL, TWO CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM (1978); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904); WEBER, supra note 2; MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds., 2002).
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behavior, and both failed in the same way. They transformed
acute insights into totalizing theories and thereby elided
complexity, contingency, and contextuality. While capitalist
forms tend to create certain kinds of risks and results, it is
the specific form of capitalism in its specific context—not
“capitalism in general”—that determines the scope, extent,
and impact of those risks and results. Werner Sombart was
insightful when he noted that capitalist forms showed “a
tendency to proclaim the supremacy of business interests
over all other values,” but he stumbled when he moved from
tendency to necessity.62 Then, he declared that capitalism’s
“acquisitive drive” was “quantitatively and qualitatively
absolute” and necessarily brought “unscrupulousness and
ruthlessness” that made “all moral and temperamental
inhibitions disappear.”63 Such uncompromising claims led
only to escalating abstractionism and unending disputation.
Although “capitalism in general” had no absolute form or
necessary consequence, its various historical manifestations
did tend to pose certain common risks. One was dramatic
economic expansions and contractions that generated
periodic crises,64 while another was the tendency to
concentrate wealth and increase economic inequality.65 Less
obvious was the tendency to define risk in narrow economic
terms limited to easily quantifiable and monetarily defined
risks while minimizing or ignoring other kinds of real-world

62. Werner Sombart, Capitalism, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
195, 197 (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1962).
63. Id. at 197-98.
64. See, e.g., REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 40; GEORGE SOROS, THE ALCHEMY
FINANCE (2003); FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY
RESPONSES (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISES];
Romer, supra note 40, at 573.
OF

65. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN
GLOBAL AGE (2011); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014); SASKIA SASSEN, EXPULSIONS: BRUTALITY AND
COMPLEXITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2014). Even Frank H. Knight, one of the
founders of the Chicago School of Economics, acknowledged as much. There was
“an undeniable natural tendency toward increasing inequality and concentration
of power under free enterprise itself.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND
PROFIT l (8th prtg. 1957).
A
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personal and social risks.66 Perhaps the ultimate risk of
capitalist forms arose from an apparently common drive for
continual expansion,67 a drive that placed increasingly severe
demands on the earth’s resources and environment.68
One additional risk deserves special note. All societies
harbor myths and visions testifying to their special nature,
and capitalist societies proved no exception. While analysts
made serious intellectual efforts to understand and explain
the successes of capitalist forms, the growing wealth and
concentration of economic power that accompanied those
forms ensured tenacious support for rosier explanations that
minimized their unpleasant and undesirable consequences.
The resulting risk was that partisans of some particular
capitalist form would seize on the rosiest theories available
and transform them into glorifying ideologies that, like
classic Marxist-Leninism, would lead them to deny any flaw
in their theories and—if they acquired political power—
attempt to impose their prescriptions on their societies.
Serious analysis of those relatively common risks of
capitalist forms, however, cannot rest on mere generalities.
As capitalism does not exist in any pure form, meaningful
analysis must focus on specific historical manifestations.
IV. CAPITALISM AND RISK IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
The United States has been a capitalist nation for at least
two centuries, but American economic ideas and practices
remained fluid and diverse.69 Since the 1970s, however, as
both capitalist forms and the world itself changed, those
66. Cf. LYNN HUNT, WRITING HISTORY IN THE GLOBAL ERA (2014) (emphasizing
the importance of such non-economic factors as gender, race, religion, and
culture).
67. “Modern capitalism has no purpose except to keep the show going.”
ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 143.
68. See, e.g., BAUMAN, supra note 65, at 21-23, 25, 82; ULRICH BECK, POWER IN
ELIZABETH KOLBERT,
THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2014).
THE GLOBAL AGE: A NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2005);

69. JOYCE APPLEBY, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM
(2010); AMERICAN CAPITALISM: SOCIAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) [hereinafter AMERICAN
CAPITALISM].
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ideas and practices also changed.70 While the nation
continued to experience risks common to capitalist forms, one
of those risks grew particularly acute. The last quarter of the
twentieth century spawned glorifying capitalist ideologies
that inspired true believers, spread into politics and popular
culture, and helped make contemporary American capitalism
colder and harsher for most Americans.
Those ideologies promoted an idealized form of
capitalism that their advocates identified with the most
fundamental American value of “freedom” itself, labeling it
“free enterprise,” “free price system,” and—most commonly—
“the free market.”71 By the late twentieth century their
campaign had largely succeeded in equating the nation’s
contemporary form of capitalism with “the free market,” 72
thereby masking the fact that the former was flawed and the
latter imaginary. Unlike thorough and exacting analyses of
real-world market forces that sharpened insight and
illuminated economic processes, the market ideologies
blunted understanding and obscured consequences.73
A. The Rise of Contemporary Market Ideologies
The 1970s introduced daunting new problems that
demanded attention. Raging inflation and persistent
underemployment
challenged
orthodox
Keynesian
economics, while acute social and political changes

70. E.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED
AMERICA (2009); EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND
RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
71. Capitalism, in BARRON’S, supra note 6.
72. JERRY Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN WESTERN
THOUGHT, at ix-xvii (2002); Richard F. Teichgraeber III, Capitalism and
Intellectual History, 1 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 267-69 (2004).
73. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 110 (2015);
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM, supra note 14, at 51. It is essential to distinguish
such market ideologies—sweeping, extreme, and intensely partisan—from
professional economic analyses of markets that are careful, qualified, and often
highly skeptical of market behavior. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF
INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 288-362
(2012).
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reoriented American politics.74 The turmoil undermined faith
in government, revitalized neo-classical economics, and
fragmented the New Deal coalition.75 Anti-tax movements
spearheaded the way, and by the 1980s anti-tax passions
dominated economic “conservatism” and the Republican
Party.76 Indicative of the dramatic reorientation in
conservative thinking, neither Hayek’s classic work, The
Road to Serfdom (1944)77 nor Friedman’s early polemic,
Capitalism and Freedom (1962)78 gave significant attention
to taxation, while no Republican presidential candidate from
Barry Goldwater to Gerald Ford adopted the anti-tax
ideology.79 By the 1980s, however, anti-tax ideologies had
spread widely among Americans and became gospel in the
Republican Party, and they spurred ever more fervent
condemnations of government and ever more extravagant
praise for its supposed opposite, “the free market.”
The market ideologies indicted government tax policy,
regulatory practices, social welfare programs, and all
“interferences” with “private” economic activity.80 Although
Hayek had consistently praised free markets in his earlier

74. See, e.g., GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, RULE AND RUIN: THE DOWNFALL OF
MODERATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 288-362 (2012);
ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
SINCE THE 1960S (2012); Alice O’Connor, The Politics of Rich and Rich: Postwar
Investigations of Foundations and the Rise of the Philanthropic Right, in
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 69, at 228-48.
75. See, e.g., ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE
MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION (2012); DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE
UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS (2012);
JAMES LIVINGSTON, THE WORLD TURNED INSIDE OUT: AMERICAN THOUGHT AND
CULTURE AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY 1-20 (2010).
76. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT
OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 4, 7 (2005); MIKE O’CONNOR, A COMMERCIAL
REPUBLIC: AMERICA’S ENDURING DEBATE OVER DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 206, 208,
210 (2014).
77. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
78. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19.
79. O’CONNOR, supra note 76, at 213, 220, 224-25.
80. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
1950–1980 (1984).
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work, he had also accepted a role for state regulation.81 By
1976, however, he was insisting more fervently on the sheer
benevolence of the market’s “spontaneous ordering” and
condemning the very idea of any contrary “social justice,” an
idea he castigated as a “quasi-religious superstition” that was
“at present probably the gravest threat to most other values
of a free civilization.”82
By the 1980s Hayek, Friedman, and other market
ideologues had become gurus of a fundamentalist faith that
urged adoption of “market-based” policies across the social
and economic spectrum.83 That faith transformed American
ideals of freedom, opportunity, and liberty into abstractions
designed to serve as unquestioned prescriptions for “the free
market,” and it forged a passionate union between antigovernment resentments and ostensibly “true” patriotism.84
Above all, the faith embraced two counterpoised moral
assumptions: the economically successful were hardworking, productive, self-sufficient, and morally exemplary;
the economically unsuccessful were lazy, incompetent,
willfully dependent, and morally dubious or worse. The
former were worthy; the latter were not.85
In retrospect, Irving Kristol’s Two Cheers for Capitalism
proved something of a turning point. Disturbed over an
“inner spiritual chaos” that was “created by the dynamics of
capitalism itself,” Kristol offered a sharp moral critique of
Hayek, a thinker whom he admired as “the most intelligent
defender of capitalism today.”86 In elaborating his market
81. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 101, 125, 142-47; HAYEK, THE ROAD
77, at 119-33.

TO SERFDOM, supra note

82. 2 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
JUSTICE 62, 66-67 (1976).
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SOCIAL

83. See generally BURGIN, supra note 75, at 152-85.
84. See GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF
GOVERNMENT (1999).
85. Consequently, ideology increasingly polarized the nation, see ALAN I.
ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010), with racial tensions playing an important role, e.g.,
Alberto Alesina et al., Why Doesn’t the US Have a European-Style Welfare State?,
39 (Harv. Inst. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 1933, Nov. 2001).
86. KRISTOL, supra note 61, at 268.
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theory, Kristol observed, Hayek rejected the principle that
“justice” required the “proportionality of reward to moral
merit.”87 Instead, Hayek claimed that “in a free society it is
neither desirable nor practicable that material rewards
should be made generally to correspond to what men
recognize as merit.”88 In taking such a position, Kristol noted,
Hayek was “opposing a free society to a just society.”89 That
was profound error. Human beings, Kristol countered,
“cannot accept the historical accidents of the marketplace—
seen merely as accidents—as the basis for an enduring and
legitimate entitlement to power, privilege and property.”90 To
protect both capitalism and democracy, he urged, their
defenders had to satisfy the nation’s “hunger for authority”
by providing a unified moral justification for both.91 “The
results of the political process and the exercise of individual
freedom—the distribution of power, privilege, and property—
must also be seen as in some profound sense expressive of the
values that govern the lives of individuals.”92 Calling for
moral justifications for “the distribution of power, privilege,
and property,” Kristol’s clarion inspired a generation of
paeans to the virtues—economic, political, and moral—of
“the free market.”
George Gilder was one of those who responded. The free
market, he announced, embodied the “key to peace and
prosperity.”93 Although it brought unequal economic results,
government interventions were far worse. They “always,
unfortunately, turn out bad: highly skewed, hugely unequal,
presumptively unfair, and changing little, or getting worse.”94
87. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 93, quoted in KRISTOL, supra note
61, at 259.
88. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 94, quoted in KRISTOL, supra note
61, at 259-60. Kristol misquoted Hayek, substituting the word “society” at the
beginning of the quote for the word “system,” which the latter had used in the
original.
89. KRISTOL, supra note 61, at 260.
90. Id. at 263.
91. Id. at 266-67.
92. Id. at 267.
93. GILDER, supra note 54, at 9-10.
94. Id. at 10.
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Every attempt to redistribute wealth “strikes at the living
heart of democratic capitalism.”95 The unsuccessful must
learn to appreciate the successful, for “the golden rule of
economics” taught that “the good fortune of others is also
finally one’s own.”96 Indeed, amassing great wealth was an
achievement that demanded praise. “The risk-bearing role of
the rich cannot be performed so well by anyone else,” Gilder
declared.97 Providing for the general welfare—“turning gold
into goods and jobs and art”—was the “the function of the
rich: fostering opportunities for the classes below them in the
continuing drama of the creation of wealth and progress.”98
The new market ideologies relied on all-encompassing
abstractions to support glittering simplifications that
reached far beyond any policies reasonably necessary to deal
with the distinctive problems of the 1970s and early 1980s.
They claimed that “the free market” was the most “efficient”
form of economic organization but refused to acknowledge
the complexities and subjectivities embedded in economic
concepts of “efficiency.”99 Equally, they dismissed the fact
that their claims of “efficiency” were based on contrary-tofact assumptions about perfect competition and perfect
market-clearing equilibria.100 Highlighting the importance of
incentives and “self-interest,” they ignored the complexities
of human motivation and the fact that the very idea of “selfinterest” was itself malleable and culturally formed.101
The market ideologues draped their claims in absolutist
terms, as though the concepts they deployed contained
95. Id.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id. at 63.
98. Id.; accord HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 127, 129-30.
99. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY:
DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE (1980).
100. See ATKINSON, supra note 73, at 244; ROGER BACKHOUSE, A HISTORY OF
MODERN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 311 (1985); CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM, supra note
14, at 72-73.
101. See, e.g., JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 316-17 (2012); HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra
note 58, at 143-47.
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inherent meanings that mandated the specific policies they
urged. They claimed possession of such honored terms as
“freedom,” “liberty,” and “property,” while avoiding the fact
that those concepts represented highly complex and
invariably qualified ideas whose practical significance
changed as social, economic, and political conditions
evolved.102 Continually invoking “liberty,” for example, they
ignored the fact that “liberty” was always and necessarily
limited to certain specific liberties that were compatible with
both broad communal interests and competing individual
liberties.
Their absolutist thinking swept the ideologues to
extremes. Jude Wanniski claimed that the free market
constituted a “global mechanism” that boasted a “timeless
coherence.”103 Left alone, it generated freedom and prosperity
for all. Disrupted, it broke down, and such break-downs
stemmed from the “intellectual failure” of politicians who
dared interfere with the “timeless coherence” of that “global
mechanism.”104 Similarly, as chair of the Federal Reserve
Board, Alan Greenspan insisted that government regulation
of hedge funds was unnecessary because they “are strongly
regulated by those who lend the money.”105 “We must not lose
sight of the fact,” he proclaimed with absolute conviction,
“that risks in the financial markets are regulated by private
parties.”106 Even after the nation’s most spectacularly
successful hedge fund met financial disaster and collapsed in
ruin, Greenspan continued to affirm the benevolent
regulatory discipline of “the free market.” It took the
stunning financial catastrophe of 2008 to force him to

102. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM (2002); Ian Ayres,
Discrediting the Free Market, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 273, 276-82 (1999).
103. JUDE WANNISKI, THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS, at xi (1978).
104. See id. at xi, 17, 53 (“Decadence occurs in a political society only when the
politicians themselves lose their way . . . .”).
105. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 178, 231.
106. MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 34, at 66.
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concede—even then with the greatest reluctance—that his
market thinking contained a “flaw.”107
The way the market ideologues used the “Laffer curve”
revealed their mindset. The “curve” was a theoretical
construct that did nothing but illustrate the unexceptional
point that there was some assumed level of taxation that
would produce maximum tax revenues.108 The “curve” did not
and could not specify the location of that maximizing level.
Indeed, it could as readily suggest tax increases as tax cuts,
and studies found that a maximizing rate could be as high as
71%, many times what the anti-tax market ideologues
desired.109 Moreover, the “curve” did not and could not dispute
the fact that the actual impact of tax cuts would depend for
the most part on prevailing economic conditions and that
they would not necessarily stimulate enough growth to
increase—let alone maximize—revenues. Finally, the
“curve” did not and could not specify the proper beneficiaries
of any tax cuts or identify the wealthy as their proper
paramount beneficiaries. The market ideologues, however,
ignored those facts and, instead, hailed the “Laffer curve” as
proof of the unquestionable beneficence of tax cuts, especially
steep cuts for the wealthy.110
David Stockman, President Ronald Reagan’s first budget
director, captured the true-believer mentality he saw
animating the administration’s market ideologues. The
“Laffer curve,” he wrote, resonated instinctively with Reagan
himself because he had long resented high taxes on the
rich.111 Thus, when Reagan heard about the “curve,” he “knew
instantly that it was true,” for it “set off a symphony in his
107. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 11, 46 (2008) (testimony
of Alan Greenspan, Former Chair, Federal Reserve Board).
108. See Don Fullerton, Laffer Curve, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 839, 839-41 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed.
2008).
109. Id. at 839, 841.
110. See, e.g., WANNISKI, supra note 103.
111. DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH
REAGAN REVOLUTION 10-11 (1987).
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ears.”112 Reagan and many of his advisors, Stockman
concluded, embraced a “fiscal mythology.”113 They took the
Laffer curve “literally (and primitively)” and regarded it as
“magical.”114
Further, to support their anti-government animus and
“free market” faith, the market ideologies denied the fact of
“private” coercive power and the growing oligopolization of
the American economy.115 They defined “the free market” as
a system that guaranteed economic liberty by giving all
individuals the right to bargain freely and equally with all
others, and they identified coercive “power” solely with
governmental compulsion and its allegedly ever-present
threat to their imagined ideal of absolute “liberty.” Thus, the
market ideologies conjured away the hard fact that “private”
power existed and that those who commanded substantial
economic resources often compelled the compliance of
Americans with few or no resources.116
Not surprisingly, then, the market ideologies also
ignored the fact that capitalist forms invariably relied on
massive government support. From Hamilton’s national
bank to the latest communication marvels of the twenty-first
century, American governments at all levels created the
conditions, infrastructure, and many of the innovations that
fueled the nation’s economic growth.117 The United States, in
112. Id. at 10.
113. Id. at 74.
114. Id. at 295.
115. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED:
THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010)
(exploring the effects of monopolies present in the current U.S. economy).
116. See, e.g., LESTER C. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS OF
DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 142 (1975) [hereinafter THUROW, GENERATING
INEQUALITY]. Compare HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 26, at 120-21 (1960)
(explaining why workers are “free” according to market theory), with BARBARA
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001)
(detailing some of the innumerable factors that intimidate and oppress lowincome workers).
117. E.g., BECKERT, supra note 16; SHARON ANN MURPHY, INVESTING IN LIFE:
INSURANCE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 100-02 (2010); RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED:
THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2011);
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fact, benefitted from “one of the most interventionist
governments when it comes to innovation.”118 The nation’s
space program, for example, provided a wide range of new
technologies that private companies subsequently exploited,
which led Republican Senator Ted Cruz to identify “NASA’s
primary mission” as “exploring space and developing the
wealth of new technologies that stem from its exploration.”119
Equally, market ideologies ignored two of the most
compelling facts of economic history, that governments often
channeled market behavior effectively and that, when
channeling laws were weakened or repealed, economic crises
and depressions often followed.120
Thus, on the broadest level the market ideologies
dismissed historical context and glossed over the contingent
and complex factors that actually determined changing levels
of economic activity and social welfare.121 That compulsion to
deny history led George Stigler, one of the major figures in
the neo-classical revival, to advance “a hypothesis on the
nature of political life” that was manifestly false on its face.122
Because the “announced goals of a policy are sometimes
unrelated or perversely related to its actual effects,” Stigler
maintained, “the truly intended effects should be deduced

GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS (Richard R.
Nelson ed., 1982); THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH (Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986).
118. MAZZUCATO, supra note 47, at 4.
119. Hunter Walker & Jessica Orwig, Ted Cruz’s Plan for NASA is Epic, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-tedcruzs-epic-plan-for-nasa-2015-1.
120. See, e.g., REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 40; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note
39; CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM, supra note 14, at 52.
121. See, e.g., ANGUS MADDISON, CONTOURS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1–2030 AD:
ESSAYS IN MACRO-ECONOMIC HISTORY (2007); JONATHAN D. OSTRY, ANDREW BERG
& CHARALAMBOS G. TSANGARIDES, REDISTRIBUTION, INEQUALITY, AND GROWTH (Apr.
2014) (staff paper of the International Monetary Fund); Paul A. Volcker,
Foreword to the New Edition, in SOROS, supra note 64, at xi-xii.
122. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 140
(1975).
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from the actual effects.”123 Such an approach erased realworld history from what passed as economic analysis.
As a matter of that real-world history, the market
ideologies in effect dredged up the standard claims of
centuries-old, right-wing rhetoric, the arguments of
perversity, futility, and jeopardy that Albert O. Hirschman
so deftly illuminated. Those well-rehearsed anti-government
and anti-“reform” assertions relied heavily on myths, clichés,
stereotypes, personal biases, and stark oversimplifications
that seldom captured real-world consequences. “[T]hey stand
effectively exposed as limiting cases,” Hirschman concluded,
“badly in need, under most circumstances, of being qualified,
mitigated, or otherwise amended.”124
The ultimate foundation of the market ideologies was
manifest. Pre-existing social and political commitments, not
the demands of any compelling economic reasoning, underlay
their absolutist claims and blessed the unyielding faith of
their true believers.125
B. Risks and Results
Backed by anti-government passions, determined
economic interests, and a new Republican coalition, market
ideologies helped reorder American life, and by the early
twenty-first century their damaging consequences had
become readily apparent.126 The field of economics embraced

123. Id. (emphasis in the original).
124. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY 167 (1991).
125. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2003); THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY, supra note 116.
126. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013). Market-based policies brought failures to
international aid programs, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus,
Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in
the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973 (2006),
and may have contributed to the growing governmental unwillingness to
prosecute corporations and their officials for economic crimes, see BRANDON L.
GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS
(2014); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003); Jed S.
THE
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neo-classic approaches, grew more theoretical and modelbased, and dismissed social, political, and historical
considerations. As a result, the profession’s orientation
became increasingly compatible with the market ideologies
and tended to support a “thoughtless alliance with new
business elites determined to use public policy for private
rather than communal ends.”127 Repeated tax cuts brought
huge and continuing government deficits and forced the
nation into a growing reliance on foreign countries and their
investments,128 while repeated cuts to government budgets
led to declines in public services and accelerating
deterioration of the nation’s infrastructure.129 In the field of
corporate governance, market ideologies gave birth to the
theory that corporations should seek nothing but the
maximization of “shareholder value.”130 Rather than leading
to the steady corporate growth that it promised, the theory
brought lavish and excessive compensation packages to highlevel insiders, the pursuit of short-term goals that often
compromised long-term corporate health, and substantial
harm to the interests of shareholders themselves.131

Rakoff, Justice Deferred is Justice Denied, 62 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 19, 2015, at
8.
127. MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, A PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS
PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 184 (2001).
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128. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM 196-202 (2015) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE];
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, CHART BOOK: THE BUSH TAX CUTS (Dec. 10,
2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-12tax.pdf;
Jonathan Huntley, The Long-Run Effects of Federal Budget Deficits on National
Savings and Private Domestic Investment (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper
No. 2014-02, Feb. 2014).
129. E.g., Bruce Alberts, Editorial, Am I Wrong?, 339 SCIENCE 1252, 1252 (2013)
(discussing the failure of the United States to invest in infrastructure and
scientific research); William F. Marcuson III, Fixing America’s Crumbling
Infrastructure: A Call to Action for All, 12 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 473 (2008).
130. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
131. See ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 39, at 68-70; LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC pt. 2 (2012).
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In the field of education, market ideologies spurred a
movement to make schooling a for-profit business. Roseate
market-based promises finessed the real problems that
plagued the nation’s educational system—racial segregation,
concentrated poverty, and inadequate and unequal public
funding—while for-profit schools, once established, often
produced dysfunction and disappointment.132 For the political
right, however, the movement offered significant benefits:
new opportunities for private profit, a tool for weakening
teachers’ unions, and a rationale for reducing government
funding for public education and justifying additional tax
cuts. Advocates of market-based proposals “have an
implacable hostility toward the public sector,” Diane Ravitch
concluded, and their reforms have “opened the public coffers
to profiteering, fraud, and exploitation by large and small
entrepreneurs.”133
Market ideologies proved particularly harmful to the
cause of environmental protection. Although scientific
evidence of the anthropogenic causes of climate change was
overwhelming,134 many influenced by market ideologies
ignored or denied it. They recognized that—if the scientific
evidence were accepted—it would require governments to act
vigorously to channel economic behavior along more

132. DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4-6, 325 (2013); see
HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 58, at 88-89 (discussing the conditions in
which voucher schemes in a market-based solution remedies government
programs and how education does not fit those conditions); RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A SMARTER CHARTER: FINDING WHAT WORKS FOR
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (2014).
133. RAVITCH, supra note 132, at 4; see also Patricia Cohen, For-Profit Colleges
Fail Standards, but Get Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2015, at A1; Tamar Lewin,
Government to Forgive Student Loans at Corinthian, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2015, at
A11 (identifying college students defrauded by their for-profit school who will
have their federal loans forgiven, which is funded by taxpayer dollars); Tamar
Lewin, Perks Grow for Presidents of Colleges, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2015, at A11 (discussing public university presidents’ increasingly high salaries).
134. As of 2010, between 97 and 98% of scientists working on climate change
agreed on the anthropogenic causes of climate change. William R. L. Anderegg et
al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 PNAS 12107, 12107 (2010).
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salutary, long-term lines.135 Because true believers could not
abide such a possibility, they were compelled to reject the
overwhelming findings of science and ignore increasingly
acute environmental dangers that threatened the United
States and the world.136
The market ideologies caused other harms that were
more immediately obvious. The devastating crash of 2008
was a spectacular example.137 Market ideologies led both
government agencies and private institutions to assume that
“the free market” would operate automatically and
efficiently. Actors throughout the system lost vigilance while
many abandoned their sense of personal responsibility and
gambled on geometrically multiplying financial risks.138
“[D]ecades of free-market fundamentalism,” Nouriel Roubini,
the co-author of an elaborate study on the crash, concluded,
“laid the foundation for the meltdown.”139 The crash
demonstrated that “free market” arrangements often failed
in their alleged “disciplinary” function and that whatever
discipline they did impose was erratic and unreliable.140

135. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE
BENEFITS OF GLOBAL ACTION (2015).
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UNITED STATES:

136. See Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay: Foundation Funding and the
Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations, 122 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 681, 682, 692 (2014).
137. See ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 56-59 (2013); ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note
39, at 72-76. See generally MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 34.
THE

138. Unregulated and short-term risk taking was a major factor in the
meltdown. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE
(2010); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND
THEMSELVES 534 (2009).
139. THE ECONOMICS BOOK 61 (Darling Kindersley Ltd. ed., 2012); see also ANAT
ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013); FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 64.
140. GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE
RISE OF FINANCE 83, 87, 141 (2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of
Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime
Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1048 & n.436 (2009) (further supporting
the proposition that free market discipline is ineffective). The federal
government’s erratic efforts to protect major financial institutions sometimes
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“Relying on institutional investors to self-regulate,” one
economist conceded, “is the economic equivalent of letting
children decide their own diets.”141
Equally important, the meltdown demonstrated that
government deregulation did not lead to “the free market” as
true believers proclaimed. Rather, deregulation simply
transferred more economic decision-making power to the
economic elite that controlled the nation’s dominant private
economic institutions,142 and it was those institutions that
pursued the policies and made the decisions that caused the
shattering worldwide crash.
Notably, the crash highlighted the risks inherent in the
failure of absolutist market ideologies to take account of
changing social and institutional contexts.143 Few economists
anticipated the meltdown, and a great many believed that
such a meltdown was virtually impossible. Most thought that
wise monetary policy would—as Friedman had taught—
prevent future economic catastrophes,144 while market
ideologues adamantly insisted—as Greenspan had
preached—that the self-checking operations of “the free
market” would prevent such disasters. Accordingly, they
failed to recognize the acute risks involved in radically
encouraged even greater disciplinary shortfalls. E.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34,
at 229-30.
141. Barry Eichengreen, The Last Temptation of Risk, 101 NAT’L INT. 8, 8 (2009);
see SCOTT REYNOLDS NELSON, A NATION OF DEADBEATS: AN UNCOMMON HISTORY OF
AMERICA’S FINANCIAL DISASTERS (2012) (discussing financial crises throughout
U.S. history and the influence of decisions made by investors and bankers).
142. “[E]fforts to create competitive markets do not deregulate; they redeploy
regulation.” MARC K. LANDY ET AL., CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS 2-3 (2007);
see also, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 115; KRIPPNER, supra note 140, at 14142; LYNN, supra note 115; Wilmarth, supra note 140, at 975-80.
143. Even before the meltdown of 2008 it was clear that the economic policies
that the market ideologies had helped put in place were not proving successful.
ANDREW GLYN, CAPITALISM UNLEASHED: FINANCE, GLOBALIZATION AND WELFARE
137 (2007).
144. Paul Krugman, Why Weren’t Alarm Bells Ringing?, 61 N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Oct. 23, 2014, at 41. In 2003, for example, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., a leader of the
Chicago school of economics, declared that the “central problem of depression
prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes.” Robert E. Lucas, Jr.,
Macroeconomic Priorities, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2003).
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escalating levels of debt and in new financial practices that
were shoddy and exceptionally risky, if not downright
fraudulent. Equally, they failed to understand the
significance of profound changes in the financial world from
the rapid growth of unregulated “shadow banking” to the
expanding role of international capital markets and the
multiplying complexities of the global economy.145
The crash also spotlighted another baleful consequence
of the market ideologies: rapidly increasing wealth
inequality.146 Compared to other developed countries, the
United States struggled with “one of the highest levels of
wealth inequality overall.”147 The policies of the market
ideologues brought “wage inequality” that was “relatively
high and fast-growing”148 and, by the early twenty-first
century, the “highest level of disposable income inequality
among high-income economies.”149
That painfully sharpening inequality was hardly
surprising, for the policies that the market ideologies
demanded were designed to advantage the wealthy. Steep
tax cuts on high incomes, repeal of the inheritance tax, lower
capital-gains taxes, rock-bottom effective corporate tax rates,
and allowance of corporate “inversions” that shifted tax
liabilities to foreign tax havens all led to denser

145. See MEGHNAD DESAI, HUBRIS: WHY ECONOMISTS FAILED TO PREDICT THE
CRISIS AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT ONE (2015); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note
40, at 208-15; MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE
LEARNED—AND HAVE STILL TO LEARN—FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 128-30 (2014).
146. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008); HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra
note 45; NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA 165-75 (2006). See generally
ATKINSON, supra note 73, at chs. 1-3 (discussing inequality and income
distribution).
147. James B. Davies, Wealth and Economic Inequality, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 127, 147 (Wiemer Salverda et al. eds., 2009).
148. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Inequality and Earnings
Distribution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 147,
at 177, 188.
149. Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality in Richer
OECD Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note
147, at 71, 96.
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concentrations of private wealth.150 Similarly, skyrocketing
compensation packages for corporate executives and
exceptionally low tax rates for hedge fund managers allowed
a relative handful of well-placed individuals to garner
incomes reaching billions of dollars a year. In 2014 the bonus
pool for Wall Street personnel was double the total amount
of money earned by all Americans who worked full time for
the federal minimum wage.151
Compounding those results, the market ideologies
supported other policies that directly disadvantaged ordinary
Americans. Corporate outsourcing of jobs, growing use of
“part-time” employees, restrictions on labor unions, cuts in
welfare programs, and threats to Social Security and
government-supported health care struck at the welfare of
millions.152 The deepening economic inequality that resulted
spurred a cascade of further harms. It altered marriage
practices and family arrangements, for example, which drove
many out of the “middle class” and further widened the gulf
between wealthy elites and the majority of Americans. 153
Finally, the tax cuts the market ideologies sponsored caused
ever-deepening government deficits and thereby provided
further justification for their continuing “frontal attack on
the welfare state.”154
Reinforcing those policies, market ideologies infiltrated
the United States Supreme Court and helped reshape
American law to impose additional burdens on ordinary
Americans. Controlled by a five-justice Republican majority
shaped by their party’s market ideologies, the Court
150. E.g., GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 76, at 4-6, 95; Edward D. Kleinbard,
‘Competitiveness’ has Nothing to Do With it, 144 TAX NOTES 1055 (2014); Paul
Caron, Tax Foundation: Burger King and Corporate Tax Rates and Revenues,
TAXPROF BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/09/
tax-foundation-burger-king.html.
151. Justin Wolfers, Income Inequality, in One Startling Comparison,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2015, at A3.
152. See generally HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE, supra note 45, at 6-7,
23-24, 36, 49-51 (discussing the privatization of social benefit programs).
153. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014).
154. STOCKMAN, supra note 111, at 74.
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assiduously protected corporate interests by shifting the
costs of economic enterprise onto vulnerable workers,
consumers, tort victims, civil rights plaintiffs, and claimants
who sought remedies under various federal statutes for the
economic injuries they suffered. Through a variety of
techniques, the Court restricted their access to the courts,
multiplied the obstacles they faced, and narrowed the rights
they could assert.155
One of the most striking examples of the Court’s
ideological drive came in a series of decisions dealing with
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The decisions limited
the forums where corporations could be sued, thus reducing
their potential liabilities and forcing on vulnerable parties
the burdens of pursuing remedies in distant and often foreign
forums.156 The Court did so, moreover, by discriminating
against individual defendants in favor of corporate
defendants.157 Perhaps more shocking, it did so in a way likely
to encourage American companies to send ever more jobs and
investments overseas.158 Most ominous, four of the
Republican justices implicitly rejected the public-protecting
constitutional principle established in International Shoe Co.

155. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the
General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1738-47 (2014); Judith Resnik, Constricting
Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J.
223 (2003); Alan B. Morrison, Saved By the Supreme Court: Rescuing Corporate
America, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 2011), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/
Morrison_-_Saved_by_the_Supreme_Court.pdf.
156. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750-51, 762-63 (2014);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850-51 (2011);
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785, 2790-91 (2011).
157. Compare Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607-08, 627-28
(1990), with Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850-51, and Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 75051.
158. See, e.g., McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2790-91 (holding that an English
corporation could avoid personal jurisdiction and therefore liability in New Jersey
by selling its products in the United States through a formally “independent” U.S.
distributor). The ruling provided another tactic by which American companies
could seek to avoid liability for their products by shifting their production abroad
to “independent” corporations chartered in foreign countries.
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v. Washington almost three quarters of a century ago.159
International Shoe held that sellers should not be allowed to
systematically sell their products and make their profits in a
forum while, at the same time, artfully manipulating legal
technicalities to avoid the forum’s jurisdiction over claims
related to their profit-making activities in that forum.160 In
McIntyre Machinery the four rejected that proposition and
approved precisely that kind of artful manipulation.161
Perhaps most fundamental, the market ideologies put
American democracy itself at grave risk. Portraying
democracy and the market as conjoined twins, they
essentially equated the two.162 “Markets are voting
machines,” proclaimed Citibank’s chairman, Walter Wriston;
“they function by taking referenda” and give “power to the
people.”163 Although markets gave no meaningful power to
the great majority of people, market ideologies did help make
contemporary American democracy more congruent with
“free market” economics. In both, massive flows of privately
controlled capital substantially shaped the relevant markets;
the products available to “purchaser/voters” were limited to
those that dominant institutions placed on the market;
and—perhaps most salient—“purchaser/voters” with the
most money were able to command the most market power.164
The market ideologies accelerated the commodification of
American democracy and its transformation into a
plebiscitarian plutocracy governed by “free market politics,”
a system in which the “revealed preferences”—the
willingness of buyers to spend their money for desired
products—of exceptionally wealthy individuals and
159. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315, 320-21 (1945).
160. See id.
161. See McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2785, 2790-91.
162. AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 69, at 1.
163. STEVE FRASER, THE AGE OF ACQUIESCENCE: THE LIFE AND DEATH
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZED WEALTH AND POWER 297 (2015).
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164. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); Benjamin I. Page et al.,
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51
(2013).
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resource-laden corporations increasingly shaped issues,
campaigns, and sometimes outcomes. “Free market politics”
gave those powerful donors immense power to decide which
potential candidates could seriously contend for public office,
determine the ideological content and promotional strength
of election campaigns, and mold the practical policy
consequences that followed from almost any electoral
result.165 Through a wink-and-nod system euphemistically
labeled “access,” it ensured that the “information transfers”
of the wealthy and powerful would regularly fall on the
welcoming ears of candidates and office-holders heavily
dependent on the sizeable, continuing, and purposeful
campaign funding that only the wealthy and powerful could
steadily and reliably provide.166
Not
surprisingly,
the
Supreme
Court’s
five
“conservative” Justices constitutionalized “free market
politics.” Their decisions in Citizens United v. FEC167 and

165. See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 146; JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON,
WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND
TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010).
166. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); JOHN NICHOLS & ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY,
DOLLAROCRACY: HOW THE MONEY-AND-MEDIA ELECTION COMPLEX IS DESTROYING
AMERICA (2013); BENJAMIN C. WATERHOUSE, LOBBYING AMERICA 10 (2014); John M.
de Figueiredo, Lobbying and Information in Politics, 4 BUS. & POL. 125 (2002). In
2011 and 2012, 30,000 individuals—one one-hundredth of one percent of
Americans—contributed $1.7 billion to candidates, an amount that constituted
twenty-eight percent of all disclosed federal campaign contributions. RONALD
COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE MCCUTCHEON DECISION,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17 (2014) (referencing
quotation of Richard Briffault of the Columbia Law School). In the same years
nearly 600 individuals contributed $250,000 or more each to political action
committees, while ninety-five individuals gave more than a million dollars apiece.
Richard Briffault, McCutcheon and the Future of Campaign Finance, JURIST:
ACADEMIC COMMENTARY (Nov. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/
11/richard-briffault-mccutcheon-campaign.php. Perhaps even more striking, as of
mid-2015 a mere 158 families had contributed $176 million toward the 2016
election, half of all the campaign funds raised. Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen
& Karen Yourish, From only 158 Families, Half the Cash for ‘16 Race, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2015, at A1.
167. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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McCutcheon v. FEC,168 formally based on the First
Amendment and a near absolute equation of money with
“speech,” overturned precedents and invalidated legislative
limits on campaign funding. Most important, in Citizens
United they announced that only the prevention of
“corruption” could justify limits on campaign spending and
then ruled that only explicit “quid pro quo” deals could
constitute such “corruption.”169 To drive their meaning home,
they declared that neither “[t]he appearance of influence or
access” nor whatever could somehow be portrayed as
“independent” campaign spending could constitute
“corruption.”170 With that tinier-than-the-eye-of-a-needle
definition, they made Citizens United a guidebook that could
fairly be entitled “Political Corruption for Dummies.”171 They
taught all but the most willfully obtuse how to safely attempt
to buy and sell political influence, policies, offices, and
votes.172 Their support for “free market” politics served the
168. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the
Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure
Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (2005) (exploring the Supreme Court’s recent
hostility toward campaign finance regulation and anticipating possible future
changes in this jurisprudence).
169. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345, 357, 359.
170. Id. at 357, 359-60. Prior cases had defined “corruption” more broadly and
allowed proof under lower evidentiary standards. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 134-36, 143 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155-56, 161-62 (2003);
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440-41, 456 (2001);
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390, 391-94, 397 (2000).
171. Ironically, the decisions were supported by justices who claimed to be
“originalists.” In fact, eighteenth-century Americans involved in the Revolution
and Constitution making were reacting against the political “corruption” they
attributed to the influence of concentrated power and excessive wealth. Such
corruption, they believed, would undermine republican values and destroy
republican institutions. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967) (identifying rampant fear of corruption as part of
American Revolution ideology); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 107-114, 413-19 (1998). On some of the dangers of
“corruption” after Citizens United, see Richard Briffault, Coordination
Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 88 (sidebar) (2013).
172.
Voice is most likely to function as an important mechanism in markets
with few buyers or where a few buyers account for an important
proportion of total sales, both because it is easier for few buyers than for
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interests of the Republican Party173 and fit snugly with the
teachings of the market ideologies about the beneficence of
self interest, the properly commanding power of “revealed
preferences,” and the compelling need to honor and protect
the interests of those who proved their virtue by amassing
private wealth.174
CONCLUSION
To reverse those damaging developments and preserve a
shared and genuine freedom, equality, and democracy, it is
essential to understand the socially constructed nature of
markets, identify the visible hands that shape those markets,
and recognize the practical consequences of the nation’s
contemporary form of “free market” capitalism. It is
essential, in other words, to recognize the economic fallacies
and political biases embedded in the market ideologies. Such
recognition can lead to new and effective policies designed to
reshape real-world markets for everyone’s benefit.175
Americans have consistently rejected the Marxist idea
that capitalism means “class conflict,” and their rejection
sounds a healthy national principle. So an authentic
American plea should go forth to the market ideologues:
“Please stop!”

many to combine for collective action and simply because each one may
have much at stake and wield considerable power even in isolation.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY, supra note 13, at 41.
“[V]oice is essentially an art constantly evolving in new directions.” Id. at 43.
173. The Court’s conservative Justices served similar interests in Shelby County
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), which enabled Republican legislatures to adopt
measures preventing large numbers of poor, elderly, and minority citizens from
voting. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March
and the Speech: History, Memory, Values, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 17, 46-55
(2014–15).
174. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 8 (2014).
175. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 73, at 179-201 (2015); PIKETTY, supra note
65, at 571-77; STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 128, at chs. 4, 6-7.

